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EXPLAINING THE SUCCESS OF THE WORLD'S LEADING 
EDUCATION SYSTEMS:  THE CASE OF SINGAPORE 
 
ABSTRACT: International comparative data on student performance has led 
McKinsey&Company, among others, to suggest that education systems will inexorably 
converge in their developmental trajectories with principals and schools enjoying more 
autonomy. This article challenges these assumptions through referencing Singapore 
where schools and professionals are still tightly controlled in key resources, curricula 
and assessment, and where other key factors contribute to its success – thereby 
evidencing multiple pathways to success. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Comparative research on school effectiveness has received intense scrutiny 
following the barrage of published studies comparing the performance of education 
systems in different parts of the world (Barber & Mourshed, 2010; Mourshed, Chijioke, 
& Barber, 2010; OECD, 2013a). McKinsey&Company, for example, in a flurry of 
highly publicized reports, has attempted to map out commonalities in the developmental 
trajectories of education systems around the world (Barber & Mourshed, 2007, 2010; 
Barber, Whelan, & Clark, 2010; Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010). Undoubtedly, 
this trajectory has had the effect of reducing the insularity of school educational 
processes that have traditionally escaped the attention of analysts and scholars, and has 
consequently led to greater educational transparency, collaboration, and diffusion of best 
practices among policy makers and schools in different countries.  
However, an argument can also be made that in the process, some researchers 
have adopted a somewhat reductionist, analytical approach in their endeavor to identify 
supposed commonalities and generic characteristics of a development trajectory across 
all education systems, thereby ignoring pertinent sociocultural, political and other 
contextual features that have underpinned and impacted the development of education 
systems in different countries (Walker & Dimmock, 2002). Consistent with this premise, 
this paper centers on Singapore, a much lauded high-performing education system 
(Darling-Hammond, 2012; OECD, 2013b) to illustrate the inherent divergence of the 
city-state’s developmental trajectory vis-a-vis those of other improving education 
systems as classified in the typology of most improved education systems by 
McKinsey&Company (Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010). 
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  Since the early 1990s, school reforms have focused on giving schools greater 
autonomy over a wide range of institutional operations in an effort to raise performance 
levels (Whitty, 1997; Carnoy, 2000; Clark, 2009; Machin and Vernoit, 2011). More 
decision-making responsibility and accountability have devolved to school principals, 
and, in some cases, management responsibilities have devolved to teachers or 
department heads. Schools have become increasingly responsible for curricular and 
instructional decisions as well as for managing financial and material resources and 
personnel. These reforms are adopted on the premise that schools themselves are more 
knowledgeable about their own needs and the most effective ways to allocate resources 
and design the curriculum so that they can better meet the needs of their students.  
  Our argument is not that Singapore, unlike other developed education systems, 
has defied the trend towards devolution and autonomy; rather, it is about the degree to 
which it has followed this trend, and the diverse means by which the Singapore Ministry 
of Education (MOE) has managed to maintain control in the process of granting limited 
autonomy to schools and principals. It is also about the need to consider a host of other 
factors that account for a high-performing education system. A glance at the world’s 
leading systems reveals that Singapore is not alone in this respect and that a range of 
complex diverse responses are detectable, resulting in different degrees and forms of 
autonomy, as well as a coterie of disparate but influential factors on performance. In 
short, it is apparent that there are multiple pathways to success. 
  Evidence for this claim, specifically in relation to Singapore, is found in the 
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2012 data (OECD, 2013c). These 
data show that while Singapore is second only to Shanghai in mathematics performance, 
it is below the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
average for school autonomy overall (OECD, 2013c, p.51). Specifically, it is 
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significantly below the OECD average for school autonomy and resource allocation 
(OECD, 2013c, p.131), and for school autonomy and curricula and assessments (OECD, 
2013c, p.132). Table 1 below shows school autonomy in Singapore relative to selected 
other systems. 
_____________________ 
Insert Table 1 here 
_____________________ 
 
UNIVERSAL DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORY? 
According to the McKinsey&Company typology, twenty of the most improved 
education systems around the world are classified as belonging to one of four distinct 
stages of development, and inexorably progressing from one stage to another (Mourshed, 
Chijioke, & Barber, 2010). First, education systems in the least performing stage – from 
poor to fair – are reported to be focused on supporting students to achieve basic levels of 
literacy and mathematics, by providing support for lowly skilled teachers, meeting basic 
student learning needs, and elevating all schools to minimum quality thresholds. 
Education systems belonging to the second stage of development – from fair to good – 
devote their energies and resources to consolidating system foundations, by generating 
high quality system-wide performance data, introducing teacher and school 
accountability measures, and generating organizational and pedagogical models. In the 
third stage of development (from good to great), education systems work on ensuring 
the professional status of school teachers and principals via the implementation of 
informed practices and clear career paths. Education systems in the fourth and last stage 
- from great to excellent – shift the locus of improvement from the center to schools 
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themselves. Educators learn with peers within and across schools, and participate in 
system-sponsored innovation and experimentation.  
The McKinsey&Company typology asserts unequivocally that across the four 
stages of development, education systems have developmental trajectories that are 
invariant across different contextual backgrounds: 
 
 ‘What our analysis reveals is that despite their different contexts, all 
improving school systems appear to adopt a similar set of 
interventions that is appropriate to their stage of the journey. This is 
not to say that context is not important, but it is secondary to 
getting the fundamentals right’ (Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 
2010, p. 17). 
 
 
In the typology, only Finland qualifies to be placed in the highest stage, while 
Singapore is classified as belonging to the ‘good to great’ stage. Singapore earns the 
status of a ‘sustained improver’ by virtue of its cumulative and consistent rises in student 
achievement spanning multiple data points (1983 to 2007) and subject areas (reading, 
mathematics, science). However, according to PISA 2012 results (OECD, 2012), 
Shanghai had eclipsed Finland in terms of mathematics, reading and science, and the top 
seven places were by then occupied by East and South-east Asian countries, including 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. The domination of Asian systems is 
noteworthy, and in just a short time (2009-2012) McKinsey&Company’s classification 
of Finland as the world’s only excellent system, seemed inappropriate if not misleading.  
The allusion from McKinsey&Company, however, is that the Singapore 
education system exhibits most, if not all, of the developmental characteristics of other 
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similarly improved systems in the same stage, and is predicted to manifest even those of 
Finland as it continues on its improvement journey. These characteristics comprise first, 
the expected professionalization of teachers and principals, and second the staged 
decentralization of decision-making from the center to school level. This ‘truism’ 
according to McKinsey&Company occurs invariably as follows: 
 
 ‘Systems on the poor to fair journey… exercise tight, central 
control over teaching and learning processes in order to minimize 
the degree of variation between individual classes and across 
schools. In contrast, systems moving from good to great… only 
provide loose, central guidelines for teaching and learning 
processes, in order to encourage peer-led creativity and innovation 
inside schools, the core driver for raising performance at this stage’ 
(Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010, p. 34). 
 
 
Further evidence of a generic correlation between high performance and the 
loosening of centralization is given by the PISA 2012 results (OECD, 2013c), the report 
on which asserts that the ‘highest-performing school systems are those that allocate 
educational resources more equitably among advantaged and disadvantaged schools and 
that grant more autonomy over curricula and assessments to individual schools’ (p. 4). 
However, as noted elsewhere in this paper, the correlation does not hold for Singapore. 
 We contend that these assumptions are unnecessarily unequivocal, and without 
due regard for the broader socio-cultural and political contexts of different societies, 
including the present case of Singapore. As previously stated, according to PISA 2012 
results (OECD 2013c), the top seven places in performance in mathematics, reading and 
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science are all Asian (Shanghai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Macao, and 
Japan), while the next five places are European (Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Netherlands, 
Estonia and Finland). It is readily apparent that there is as much variation in education 
systems within each of the Asian and European clusters, as there is between them – in 
terms of school organization and governance, and centralization and autonomy. This 
leads us to the conclusion that there are multiple pathways to becoming a top performing 
system. Claims of generalized characteristics across all systems as they progress to the 
top are thus vulnerable to the criticism that they are oversimplifications and fail to take 
into account the unique complexities of culture and context that characterize each 
system in its development trajectory (Dimmock & Walker, 2005). 
 Criticisms of ‘naïve empiricism’ that are angled towards the McKinsey&Co. 
reports, can also be leveled at those emanating from OECD PISA reports and TIMSS.  
‘Naïve empiricism’, according to Juslin, Winman and Olsson (2000), consists of two 
elements; first, overconfidence - sometimes verging on dogmatism - in conclusions 
based on empirical data; and second, the ‘hard-easy’ effect, which refers to the over-
simplification or reductionism of complex phenomena. In the present context naïve 
empiricism has both of these elements. First, the use of a narrow range of scores on a set 
of tests to represent a much larger phenomenon of student learning outcomes – for 
example, with PISA, scores for mathematics, science and reading on an international 
achievement test, which are then assumed to represent a much broader-based concept of 
student learning outcomes. Although McKinsey&Co uses more sources of student 
achievement data (including TIMSS and PISA) than does PISA, all these data are still 
quantitative snapshots. There are no qualitative data on student learning and growth. 
Hence the use of such test scores fails to adequately capture the complexity of student 
learning and development. Second, both McKinsey&Co. and PISA tend to simplify the 
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attributions of education system success to a misleadingly small number of factors. That 
is, they simplify the implications and attributions of such scores to relatively few factors, 
such as school autonomy and teacher professionalism, when multiple factors within and 
without school account for a system’s performance. A further elaboration of these 
criticisms is, thirdly, that although PISA collects data on student, family, and school 
variables, neither McKinsey&Co nor PISA take sufficient account of socio-cultural 
factors in their explanation of school success. For example, broader socio-cultural 
contextual variables that influence student school performance – such as race/ethnicity, 
diversity in classrooms and schools, parenting processes, socio-economic environment 
and resource equity (eg. class size, types of programme offered, compensatory education, 
and social mobility) - are ignored. Finally, although the McKinsey study relies on 
qualitative and quantitative data, and PISA exclusively on quantitative survey data, both 
adopt a cross-sectional research design. Thus inferences of causality may be 
inappropriate if not misleading.  
Our argument on the dangers of naïve empiricism is well illustrated by the 
unique contexts of two South-East Asian systems - Singapore and Vietnam. In 
Singapore’s case, over the short period of 50 years, it has risen from a Third World, 
port-based British colony to a First World independent republic whose economy has one 
of the highest per capita incomes in the world (Gopinathan, 2007). During this period it 
has transformed itself into a stable political entity (although described as a democracy, 
one party has monopolized power since the nation state became an independent republic 
in 1965), built a trusted global banking and financial sector, diversified its economic 
structure, and created a harmonious, loyal citizenry from a previous divided ethnic and 
linguistic population, the size of which has increased five-fold to 5 million people 
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(Gopinathan, 2007). Having participated in PISA testing  since 2009, it was rated by 
OECD to be the top education system globally in 2015 (Coughlan, 2015).  
In comparison, Vietnam, also an impressive performer in PISA tests, has a 
communist government, and a large population of 90 million. Unlike Singapore, its fast 
economic growth rate began only a decade ago, and until 2012, it had not participated in 
international achievement tests. Unlike Singapore, poverty in both rural and urban areas 
is significant. Yet, entering the PISA tests for the first time in 2012, Vietnam was ranked 
a high16th out of 61 participant countries. – a higher ranking than England, Germany and 
the USA – and 12th in 2015 (Coughlan, 2015). As a recently emergent economy and 
society, where governance is still heavily centralized, and improved teacher 
professionalism is an aspiration for the future, Vietnam’s PISA performance suggests a 
highly successful school system. Yet, Vietnam’s ‘success’ is apparently due to three 
factors (Coughlan, 2015): high government commitment to investing in education (more 
than 21 per cent of Government expenditure went to education in 2010), to hard working 
students and teachers, a high degree of centralized control of schools, where, for 
example, the Government designed a curriculum focusing on deep understanding and 
mastery of core skills, and to high levels of teacher dedication and status in society. 
However, others suggest many other contributory factors, for example, a high drop-out 
rate among weaker students prior to eligibility for PISA, leaving only the most able to be 
tested (The Economist, 2013). Singapore and Vietnam – both high performing systems 
on PISA tests, illustrate that while having some features in common (such as strong 
centralization), each has a distinctly different range of contextual factors accounting for 
their respective success. 
In the sections that follow, our analysis systematically unravels the particular 
contextual conditions underlying the educational development of Singapore. It compares 
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the status quo - as evidenced by the PISA 2012 results (OECD 2013c) - with the 
scenario depicted in the typological assumptions espoused by McKinsey&Company 
(2010). The analysis is themed according to professionalization of teachers; 
professionalization of principals, their values and mission; and central control – all in 
relation to autonomy. In succeeding sections, we go on to explain the complexity of 
factors that de facto explain Singapore’s pathway to success. Singapore constitutes an 
example of how each country forges its own pathway, leading to the conclusion that 
there are multiple pathways to success. 
 
PROFESSIONALISM OF TEACHERS, THE CURRICULUM AND AUTONOMY 
The professionalization of teachers refers to the latter’s perceptions of their 
professional status and rewards as seen by themselves and other members of society 
(Hargreaves, 2000). It entails expectations of quality in the work produced, appropriate 
professional conduct, and elements of autonomy in the professional work done (Helsby, 
1995; Larson, 1977). According to Hargreaves (2000), teachers if deemed to be 
professionals, should earn substantial and competitive salaries, resist public discourses 
that blame teachers for student underachievement, regulate the certification of teaching 
staff in schools, acquire state-of-the-art pedagogical knowledge, focus collaborative 
energies on improving teaching and learning, spend time on collaboration in daily 
school life (in addition to after-school or vacation provisions), and collaborate with 
colleagues within and across schools.  
When teachers in the Singapore education system are matched against these 
criteria, they do appear to have achieved professional status (MOE, 2014). More 
specifically, Singapore teachers are recruited from the top one-third of the cohort of 
school graduates. While in England, there is a teacher shortage, in Singapore, there are 
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eight applicants for every teacher training position (Crehan, 2014). Singapore teachers 
receive salaries that are competitive with equally well-qualified civil servants in other 
government ministries, and they are benchmarked with those of similar qualifications 
and job responsibilities in the private sector. There is society-wide respect for the 
teaching profession in Singapore. The pre- and in-service training programs that teachers 
undergo are of high quality and benchmarked internationally. Within and across schools, 
there are structured provisions to facilitate teacher individual and peer collaboration (e.g., 
sponsorship for postgraduate courses, professional learning communities, network 
learning communities and subject chapters across schools, structured mentoring) (MOE, 
2014).  Unquestionably the biggest indicator of the importance placed on teacher 
professional development is the requirement introduced by the Singapore MOE in 2010 
that every school become a professional learning community (PLC), that every teacher 
participate and engage in their own and colleagues’ learning, and that all principals take 
responsibility for leading and managing their PLCs (Academy of Singapore Teachers, 
2012). Singapore teachers are given ample opportunity to experience high levels of 
professional growth. 
 However, beyond these largely structural but important provisions, teachers in 
most Singapore schools do not appear to enjoy a high degree of autonomy in the 
exercise of their professional practice. More specifically, within classrooms, they can 
theoretically choose their preferred teaching approaches from an array of competing 
pedagogical options, but they lack flexibility to tailor the curriculum or assessment to 
suit their students’ needs (Dimmock, 2011; Gopinathan & Deng, 2006). This is because 
curricular tracks are largely predetermined in the centralized Singapore education 
system, from subject-based banding in primary schools, to academic/technical tracks in 
secondary schools and post-secondary institutions (MOE, 2015). More importantly, 
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MOE perceives the existing national curriculum to be well developed and fit-for-
purpose, and therefore any school-based curriculum is seen as complementary to, rather 
than as substitute for, the national curriculum (Gopinathan & Deng, 2006), and is largely 
confined to early primary years and the co-curriculum. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
McKinsey&Company model of ‘school-based curriculum enactment’ (p. 99), Singapore 
teachers’ roles are largely restricted to interpreting, reorganizing, and restructuring the 
given curriculum, as opposed to reinventing a more individualized curriculum to suit 
their students’ needs (Gopinathan & Deng, 2006). The main curtailment to teacher 
professional autonomy, however, is the pressure exerted by the MOE for Singapore 
students to maintain their position as top performers on PISA and other international 
tests, and the equal pressure by parents for students to gain entry to higher education and 
the best universities. These two forces lead to the perpetuation of teacher over-reliance 
on didactic teaching methods at the expense of student-centered teaching and learning. 
Hogan and Colleagues’ (2009) system-wide research (see Table 2 below) on Singapore 
teaching shows the dominance of traditional forms of pedagogy at the expense of the 
introduction of new strategies. Summarizing, Hogan and Colleagues’ (2009) data prove 
that teachers in Singapore rely on whole class forms of lesson organization, with whole 
class lectures and question and answer sequences characterizing 60% of all lessons in 
both Primary 5 and Secondary 3. This pattern is quite different from the dominant forms 
of classroom organization in the West: in Britain for example, more than half of all 
lessons are organized around group work activities.  
_____________________ 
Insert Table 2 here 
_____________________ 
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Convincing evidence confirms that didactic teaching, rote memorizing and testing are 
closely aligned with high performance on international achievement tests, compared 
with student-centered methods (Hattie, 2009). 
In recent years, schools are encouraged to provide non-academic niche programs 
such as sports, uniform groups, visual and performing arts (Dimmock, 2011). If these 
niche programs have an academic character, they must complement rather than supplant 
the mainstream prescribed academic curriculum. This caveat is most evident in the then 
Education Minister Teo’s exhortation that in the context of centrally prescribed 
programs and parameters in Singapore, schools can only ‘decide on implementation, like 
further customization and implementation of non-academic school programs’ (MOE, 
1999, p.5). There are however two groups of schools that enjoy greater autonomy in 
curricular development, funding, and governance (i.e., the independent schools, and 
specialized independent schools in mathematics and science, science and technology, 
arts, and sports), but their number is small as a percentage of the entire system, with 
schools enjoying little curriculum autonomy (Dimmock, 2011).  
In the domain of assessment, students in Singapore schools are exposed to 
multiple nation-wide high-stake summative examinations at key learning stages that are 
carefully designed for the purposes of allocating them to different academic tracks based 
on their demonstrated abilities (Tan, Chow, & Goh, 2008). These examinations include 
the Gifted Education Program screening in primary 4, Primary School leaving 
Examination in primary 6, GCE ‘O’ levels in secondary 4 or 5, and GCE ‘A’ levels in 
junior colleges. These different institutional constraints collectively impinge on teachers’ 
professional autonomy in the key areas of curriculum and assessment, and exert pressure 
on the development of their identities as empowered professionals (Day, Kington, 
Stobart, & Sammons, 2006). 
PROFESSIONALISATION AND SCHOOL AUTONOMY 
 
14 
 
Overall, the relatively low level of autonomy granted to Singapore schools for 
curriculum and assessment is evidenced in the PISA 2012 data (OECD, 2013c, p.132) 
and summarized in Table 1. These data, based on the perspectives of principals, teachers, 
and administrators, show Singapore below the OECD average for school autonomy over 
resource allocation and for curriculum and assessment.  
   
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF PRINCIPALS AND AUTONOMY 
With regard to the professionalization of principals, a review of the extant 
literature indicates that principal leadership in Singapore has not been systematically 
researched (Ng et.al, 2015a).  Rather, Ng and colleagues (2015a) found a total of 37 
papers, theses and reports that referenced principal leadership. The review provides 
prima facie evidence of relatively high levels of principal leadership professionalism in 
Singapore. First, the appraisal and selection process for career  advancement to 
principalship is rigorous and based on recommendation from superiors rather than self-
selection. In a small centralized system of 360 schools, every teacher, middle-level and 
senior leader is regularly appraised and the attributes of each become well 
acknowledged among those responsible for promotion. Second, Ng and colleagues’ 
(2015) literature review emphasizes the fact that every aspiring leader goes through the 
same leadership training programs for middle leaders, and again later when aspiring to 
principalship – resulting in a uniformly high standard of system alignment. Both 
programs are monopolized by the National Institute of Education (NIE), The program 
for aspiring principals – known as the Leaders in Education Program – LEP - is run over 
6 months full-time, and includes extensive reading, project work in a school, visits 
overseas, and mentorship. Less than half of the deputy principals completing the LEP 
are selected for principalship. Few systems invest this level of resource in training future 
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principals. However, in order to examine the degree of professionalism that principals in 
Singapore schools actually enjoy in practice, it is necessary to identify first, the key 
behavioral attributes of school leadership and second, the decision-making context in 
which their leadership is enacted. 
In terms of principal attributes, Bush and Glover (2014) – writing from a 
distinctly Anglo-American and thus ethnocentric perspective - assert that despite the 
proliferation of different conceptual paradigms, few would challenge that -  
 ‘school leadership is a process of influence leading to the 
achievement of desired purposes. Successful leaders develop a 
vision for their schools based on their personal and professional 
values. They articulate this vision at every opportunity and influence 
their staff and other stakeholders to share the vision. The 
philosophy, structures and activities of the school are geared towards 
the achievement of this shared vision’ (p. 5). 
 
 
Inherent in this articulation is the compelling notion that principals ground their 
vision in clear personal and professional values, and that they assertively influence their 
organizational members to collectively achieve their vision (Day, Harris, & Hadfield, 
2001; Southworth, 1993; Yukl, 2002).  The ultimate stage is reached where schools 
become ‘self-organizing’ (Bain, 2007; Bain, Walker & Chan, 2011), with minimal 
intervention from government, and where school leaders (and teachers) enjoy substantial 
autonomy in resource allocation to undertake and sustain capacity building from within 
(Dimmock, 2012; Dinham & Crowther, 2011; King & Bouchard, 2011). In short – 
ubiquitous school-system evolutionary development is predicated on a professionally-
led model of school system evolutionary development (Hargreaves, 2011). This appears 
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to be the conceptualization underpinning the progressive stage-by-stage trajectory 
recognized and espoused by McKinsey&Company (Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 
2010). This scenario seems remote from the everyday experiences of most Singapore 
principals, as explained below. 
 
Singapore Principals, Values and Mission 
Rhetorically, according to MOE (2008), principals of Singapore schools are 
expected to be transformative agents who can equip students with the knowledge, 
competencies, and skills that are needed for the desired future. In particular, they are to 
be guided by sound values and a sense of purpose, to be able to inspire others to realize 
a shared vision, to grow teachers and other school staff, and to lead and manage change. 
The in-service training for all prospective principals is concentrated at, and monopolized 
by NIE, where programs espouse the development of capabilities in participants to 
handle complexities involved in the mission of equipping students with twenty-first 
century attributes (Ng, 2013). Toward this end, aspiring principals learn how to envision 
the future, contextualize theories to suit local needs, adapt to emerging contingencies, 
and collaborate with others. 
 However, the reality for principal leadership practice is that they are largely 
circumscribed in the definition and articulation of their professional values (Dimmock & 
Tan, 2013). Indeed, they are expected to adhere more to MOE’s corporate values and 
vision, as expressed for example in a proliferation of MOE policy documents, including 
the Desired Outcomes of Education policy, than develop their own personal and 
professional values (MOE, 2008). For example, they are required to consider the 
implications of education to nation-building (e.g., national cohesion) and to prepare 
students for the workforce (e.g., the knowledge-based economy) that the government 
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envisions will benefit Singapore. Many values that are deemed to be sacrosanct in the 
Singapore education system such as meritocracy, use of examinations, bilingualism, use 
of English as the primary medium of instruction, and the secularity of schools 
emphasizing racial and religious harmony are also enshrined and systematically 
reinforced in policy articulations such as ‘Thinking Schools, Learning Nation’, ‘Desired 
Outcomes of Education’, ‘Philosophy for Educational Leadership’, and ‘Ethos of the 
Teaching Profession’ (Tan & Dimmock, 2014). Consequently, there is little room for 
alternative schooling models such as schooling for religious or purely epistemic ends 
that do not appear to benefit the nation more than either sectoral or individual student 
interests. Expectedly,  principals ‘gradually begin to integrate their own personal and 
professional identities with MOE’s values, thereby internalizing the latter as their own, 
adopting them as a kind of “default” position for undergirding their leadership practice 
over time’ (Dimmock & Tan, 2013, p. 331). Further evidence on the degree to which the 
professionalism of Singapore principals is circumscribed, comes from clarifying the 
degree to which, and ways in which, the MOE exerts central control over schools. We 
discuss this below. 
 
CENTRAL CONTROL AND AUTONOMY 
Scholars of Singapore education have recently described the relationship 
between MOE and schools in dialectical terms. Tan and Ng (2007) for example, report 
that Singapore, like other developed systems, has (since 1997 in particular), introduced 
major educational change to prepare its students to meet the challenges of a knowledge 
economy. They go on to discuss recent educational change in Singapore using the 
framework of decentralized-centralism, first proposed by Karlsen (2000). In exploring 
the dynamics of change in the initiation, content, levels and simultaneity of the reform 
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process in terms of ‘decentralized-centralism,’ Tan and Ng (2007) describe the 
ideological roots of the decentralized-centralism policy as the tension between 
functionalist and liberal forms of education in the Singapore context.  
Recently, Chua (2014) refers to Singapore’s unique emergent system of 
governance as centralized-decentralization (reversing Tan and Ng’s terminology). Chua 
argues that while strong central decision making has been credited for Singapore’s high 
performance on international tests such as PISA and Trends in International 
Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), concerns were raised about the degree of 
responsiveness and innovation that such a centralized system could support, especially 
when trying to shift schools to focus on 21st century skills. Consequently, he says, the 
Ministry started to give bounded autonomy to schools to make local decisions. For 
example, under the ‘Teach Less, Learn More’ (TLLM) initiative, designed to reduce the 
over-reliance on rote learning and encourage schools to develop learning experiences 
that engage students, promote critical and creative thinking and support students’ 
holistic development, schools were given more flexibility to develop their own 
pedagogical approaches (e.g., inquiry or problem-based learning) as long as these 
approaches were aligned to the intent of TLLM. MOE also created ‘white spaces’ in the 
curriculum for schools to develop their own unique courses and learning programs. It 
has to be said, however, that these are mostly confined to the co-curriculum area. Since 
that time, the Ministry has pursued other policies that reflect a centralized-decentralized 
approach. For many years, according to Chua (2014), Singapore maintained relatively 
large class sizes of 40 students per teacher. However, when MOE decided to reduce 
class sizes, it did not dictate a particular size for all classes. Rather, it created a new 
matrix of student-teacher ratios that determined the overall allocation of teachers to 
schools, but left schools with the flexibility to determine the optimal class size for 
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different kinds of students. Thus some schools have chosen larger classes for higher 
ability students and smaller for lower achievers (Chua, 2014).  
That there is less centralization today than in the 1970s and 1980s is recognition 
that some decision making is best made in the schools by principals and teachers – since 
they know local conditions best. However, as Chua goes on to say, just as the flip side of 
some carefully calibrated increase in autonomy is increased accountability for results, 
from the Ministry’s perspective, centralized guidance (such as the parameters of 
schools’ student-teacher ratios) is needed to maintain coherence as a system. Chua 
(2014) argues that ultimately, the approach is designed to enable the system to reap all 
the benefits associated with tight coupling and a strong central authority without overly 
constraining the local professional class, and thus depriving the system of innovation 
and creativity. In the end, however, making centralized-decentralization work, may well 
depend on the professionalism and capacity of superintendents and school leaders to 
resist rote compliance and learn how to make local adaptations that do not stray too far 
from policy makers’ expectations. This last is peculiarly Singaporean. And as later 
discussed, the system of 360 schools is small enough to allow MOE and school leaders 
to believe that it can still be strongly controlled, if not micro-managed, from the center. 
If principals of Singapore schools may be said to operate in an environment 
characterized by relatively low levels of devolution of decision-making capacities from 
the center (i.e., MOE) to schools, the line of authority from MOE is organized around 
four geographical zones and then school clusters within the zones. The four zones are 
led by deputy directors, who work closely with a middle-tier (i.e. cluster superintendents) 
to advise and support principals. Decision-making power on school operational matters 
is delegated to principals. However beyond local operational issues, principals enjoy 
bounded autonomy in that they have to ensure that the overall developmental trajectory 
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of their schools, in terms of student learning outcomes, curricular offerings and 
assessment, staff development and appraisal, resource management, and relationships 
with community stakeholders, is tightly aligned to that of MOE (Tan & Dimmock, 
2014). They have to regularly report to MOE on how their schools contribute to the 
larger vision espoused by MOE, and therefore they do not enjoy devolution of decision-
making power over the directions of their schools, arguably the most pertinent 
requirement of an archetypical decentralized and highly performing system. Teachers 
are allocated to schools by MOE, and the large part of school budgets is also allocated to 
them. Thus principals enjoy little if any control over three main resources essential to 
their performance – curriculum, teacher selection and appointment, and finance 
(Dimmock & Tan, 2013). Furthermore, the PISA 2012 data (OECD, 2013, p.131) 
confirm that Singapore schools and principals are placed below the OECD average for 
school autonomy for use of resources and resource allocation. 
Consequently, a convincing case can be made that the real locus of strategic 
decision-making resides in powerful bureaucrats in MOE headquarters. Hence compared 
with other high-performing school systems - Victoria (Australia), Netherlands, Taiwan, 
and Hong Kong (all of which are above the OECD average) – Singapore principals have 
their powers seriously circumscribed in their professional roles and responsibilities. 
Although enjoying more latitude than in past decades, principals are still functioning as 
line managers (they are still classed as MOE ‘officers’ instead of ‘professionals’) under 
tight supervisory and monitoring conditions, ensuring the efficient implementation of 
the center’s policies. It is this characteristic - the capacity to devise and efficiently 
implement pragmatic policies.- that Gopinathan (2007) claims is the prevailing culture 
that pervades the whole system; it has been the transformative lever propelling 
Singapore’s development.  
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This fundamental relationship between MOE headquarters and schools has 
evolved but not substantively changed over time (Gopinathan, 2007; Gopinathan & 
Deng, 2006; Gopinathan, Wong, & Tang, 2008; Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010; 
Tan & Dimmock, 2014). In the earlier phases of Singapore’s educational development 
(survival phase: 1959-1978; efficiency phase: 1979-1996 – see Gopinathan, 2007), MOE 
has employed various centralized approaches such as policy mandates, curricular and 
assessment standardization, managerialism for principals, leadership handbooks, and 
standard operational procedures - in the formulation and implementation of policy. In 
the present phase of development (ability-driven phase: 1997-present), MOE has 
continued to exert strong control, albeit more subtly, over schools’ leadership, direction 
and development. These more nuanced control strategies include supplanting top-down 
bureaucratic instructions with pro-MOE self- and peer-sanctions; controlling behaviors 
via the articulation of espoused national, corporate, and professional values; and 
implementing the cluster system to provide an intermediary between MOE and schools 
(Tan & Dimmock, 2014).  The emergence of these more subtle, and less explicit MOE’s 
steering mechanisms, together with persistent and repetitive MOE’s policy rhetoric have, 
we contend, been misinterpreted by McKinsey&Company and others, as evidence that 
the locus of control in Singapore schools is significantly switching from MOE to school 
level 
In summary, the continued overwhelming influence of MOE has separately led 
scholars such as Tan and Ng (2007) and Ng (2010) to describe Singapore as having 
‘centralized’ decentralization (p. 284), and Tan and Dimmock (2014) to characterize 
Singapore’s educational governance as ‘steering… from close proximity’ (p. 757). In 
view of the bounded professional autonomy exercised by principals and teachers in an 
otherwise tightly controlled policy environment, the lingering question is - ‘how then 
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does Singapore achieve its phenomenal educational success?’ Expressed differently, are 
there other factors that explain the sustained excellence of the Singapore education 
system more authentically than McKinsey&Company’s generic emphasis on autonomy, 
self-managing schools and professionalism? 
 
EXPLAINING SINGAPORE’S EDUCATIONAL SUCCESS 
 In addressing the above question, it is important to note that there are myriad 
factors spanning the macro (social, economic, cultural environments), organizational 
(schools and classrooms), and familial (parenting and socialization practices) contexts 
that contribute to Singapore’s exceptional student academic success (Dimmock & Tan, 
2013).  In the Singapore context, the following contributors to its success are 
particularly noteworthy.  
 
Competent Policymakers 
First, the Ministry prescribes explicit and consistent values and priorities that it 
expects system- and school-level leaders to adopt. MOE policymakers and bureaucrats 
have been widely acknowledged to be competent, pragmatic, and innovative, rather than 
remote, complacent or ideological (Tan, 2011; Tan & Dimmock, 2014). They are keenly 
aware of the latest international trends in educational reform research and best practice, 
and this knowledge is instrumental in informing the continuous improvement of the 
education system.  
 
Tight Coupling 
There is also very tight coupling within the Singapore education system, made 
possible by the logistics of a small system, congruent human resource policies, and a 
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social compact premised on paternalism, which is only recently under considerable 
stress due to rising inequality and the democratization of information on social media 
(Dimmock & Tan, 2013). More specifically, the small size of the Singapore system 
comprising approximately 360 schools (all of which are large, averaging 1500 pupils) 
enables policies, backed by abundant resources due to the booming Singapore economy, 
to be implemented efficiently across schools. Indeed, Singapore per capita student 
spending is only US$5,000-6,000 (in purchasing power parity terms), remarkably lower 
than that incurred by other high-performing systems, such as Hong Kong and Ontario 
(Mourshed, Chijioke, & Barber, 2010).  
Second, there is a plethora of policies that are propitious to overall system 
coherence and effectiveness (Tan, 2011). These policies include the delineation of clear 
career tracks for principals vis-a-vis teachers, an appraisal system that rewards principals 
according to specified criteria, consensual views of currently estimated potential of 
leaders at all levels of the system, leadership preparation and development by a 
monopolist institution (NIE), between-school rotation of principals, a cluster structure 
helmed by superintendents, who are experienced principals and who mediate between 
MOE headquarters and schools, and continuous and repetitive articulation of clear 
values that underpin education policies and leadership (Tan & Dimmock, 2014). 
Indeed, it can be argued that these myriad policies serve to foster the alignment 
between MOE policies, school visions, and teachers’ goals (Ng, 2013; Ng, Wong, Choy, 
& Nguyen, 2014; Nguyen & Ng, 2014). More specifically, principals are cognizant of 
the imperative to incorporate MOE teaching-learning policies and initiatives in their 
own school vision. Ng’s (2013) research found that Singapore principals defined 
cornerstone MOE policies in teaching-learning and overarching initiatives (e.g., TLLM) 
in their definition of their school vision. In the words of a principal interviewed in Ng 
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and colleagues’ (2014) study of instructional leadership in Singapore and other Asian 
countries, he had to “first and foremost … take direction from MOE, followed by … 
school board … and parents and students.” 
Further evidence of how Singapore principals’ leadership remains tightly 
circumscribed by the MOE is provided by Ng, Nguyen, Wong and Choy (2015b). These 
authors emphasize that the MOE still has a stringent process in place for identifying and 
training all aspiring and experienced school leaders and principals. Furthermore, the 
alignment between school leadership and MOE policy is most evident in two dimensions 
– school vision and managing the instructional programme. In relation to developing 
school vision, ‘Singapore principals .…frame school goals based on.....initiatives and 
policies from the MOE, ..such as Teach Less Learn More, and 21st century competencies’ 
(Ng et al., 2015b, p.394). Singapore principals articulate their visions for their schools 
and exercise instructional leadership, but always within the frameworks of national goals 
espoused by the government, and education policies prescribed by the MOE (Ng et al., 
2015b, p. 402). Even an area of decision making that one would normally expect to be 
school-based – such as, re-balancing teaching methods in schools from teacher- to 
student-centred – is strongly framed and monitored by the MOE in its policies such as 
Teach Less, Learn More. The MOE still plays a very active role in influencing how 
principals exercise their school leadership. 
To ensure the further cascading of MOE policies to teachers, principals ensure 
that teacher appraisal is based on how they contribute toward the fulfilment of these 
policies. Results from a system-wide study of principals in Singapore (Nguyen & Ng, 
2014) showed that compared to other survey items on principals aligning teaching-
learning to school visions, school middle managers (n = 686) found it difficult to agree 
to survey items stating that principals discussed or evaluated their teaching practices 
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with respect to the school vision. This finding led Nguyen and Ng (2014) to argue “… 
that the criteria for teaching performance evaluation could be more skewed toward 
fulfilling national initiatives rather than local school indicators…” (p. 10).  Put together, 
this alignment between the center, principals, and teachers eventuates in an efficient, and 
feasibly effective, implementation of MOE policies.  
Third, importantly, these policies are enacted within the context of a paternalistic 
social compact where policymakers epitomize moral values in order to gain respect and 
deference from principals, and promote collegial cultures in schools (Tan & Dimmock, 
2014). In such a context, principals are more willing to conform and face ‘correction’ for 
unsatisfactory behavior as perceived by bureaucrats and policymakers. In fact, the 
moderating effects of this social compact can be argued to extend beyond the education 
system to the larger Singapore society, where reciprocal relationships and 
accountabilities undergird the nexus of relationships among politicians, bureaucrats, and 
citizens (Ho, 2003). The bureaucracy is perceived to be effective and knowledgeable, 
and therefore legitimate. As a consequence of the system being perceived as ‘de-
politicised’, there are high levels of adherence and deference by principals.  
        
Sociocultural Premium on Achievement  
A further source of influence that is commonly acknowledged to have 
contributed to the educational success of Singapore is its Confucian heritage. More 
specifically, as in many other Confucian heritage cultures, the predominantly Chinese 
society of Singapore values learning and academic achievement above other more 
hedonistic pursuits. Most parents invest enormous time, energy, and resources in 
nurturing the academic capacity of their children (Bray, 2007; Cheo & Quah, 2005). 
Many of them enroll their children in out-of-school private tuition or enrichment classes. 
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Results of a survey conducted by The Straits Times (the mainstream English language 
newspaper in Singapore) showed that an overwhelming majority (97%) of students from 
different educational levels (primary, secondary, and junior college levels) and of 
different abilities (failing or achieving) received coaching from either private tutors or 
tuition centers (Toh, 2008, June 15). Furthermore, at least two-thirds of students 
engaging in additional tuition reported that they benefited from and even enjoyed the 
extra-class lessons.  
Parents commonly regard private tuition as a necessity (Toh, 2008, June 15) and 
some schools expect students to receive such private tuition outside school (MOE, 2012). 
There are even signs of an increasing number of parents enrolling their nursery or 
kindergarten children in enrichment or tuition classes (Toh, 2008, June 15). The growing 
significance of the ‘shadow education industry’ in Singapore is corroborated by the 
results of the nationwide Household Expenditure Survey 2012-2013 recently conducted 
by the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI; 2014). More specifically, the results 
showed that families in present Singapore spent S$1.1b yearly on tuition, representing 
nearly double the S$650m spent a decade ago. The average household expenditure on 
tuition is now S$80 monthly compared with S$55 monthly a decade ago (Tan, 2014, 
November 9). To-date, there are a total of 850 tuition centers registered with the MOE in 
Singapore (Tan, 2014, November 9). Tuition centers are also more sophisticated in their 
offerings, catering to students of different abilities and needs. There are even tuition 
centers focusing on niche areas such as preparing children to be selected for the highly 
selective and coveted MOE Gifted Education Program (designed for the most 
cognitively endowed students), and for entry into elite secondary schools via the Direct 
Admission Scheme (designed for academically outstanding students with specialized 
competencies and skills). 
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 There is also a trend of parents procuring tuition services for very young children 
in Singapore. For example, a study of low-income parents of kindergarten children 
(Frewen, Chew, Carter, Chunn, & Jotanovic, 2015) found that two-thirds of them 
enrolled their children in after-school enrichment (mostly academic) or formal tuition 
classes. Half of these parents rated academic achievement as the most important, as 
compared to social or physical development, for their children. Another one-third of 
parents rated academic achievement to be at least as important as social or physical 
development.   
Many mothers quit their full-time jobs in order to spend time coaching or 
monitoring their children’s learning in primary schools. In addition, the emergence of 
community self-help groups affiliated to each of the four dominant races in Singapore 
provides further testimony of intensive educational support (e.g., low-cost tuition) to 
students (Bray, 2007). In schools, teachers are preoccupied with promoting academic 
achievement in their students, leading to emerging concerns of overtaxing students with 
excessive homework (MOE, 2012). Principals and policymakers also place a premium 
on academic pursuits in the larger scheme of holistic education. For example, the 
Education Endowment Scheme was launched in 1993 to provide annual grants to each 
school and each student of school-going age to support the latter’s participation in 
educational programs. 
On another plane, MOE actively seeks the involvement of parents to support 
student learning (MOE, 2012). To-date, there are many resources to facilitate parent 
involvement in their children’s education - the Parents in Education website providing 
parents with resources on parenting tips, educational news, and parent learning; funds 
for schools to use to collaborate with parents; a Partnership Resource Pack for schools; 
and structured platforms for parents to network and share best practices. These myriad 
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investments to foster parent collaboration in enhancing students’ academic achievement 
is undergirded in the primordial belief that in an island devoid of natural resources, 
human talent represents the only productive factor that can be developed to ensure the 
nation’s continuing viability (Han et al, 2011; Neo & Chen, 2007). Consequently, there 
is a system-wide assumption that students need to have strong academic foundations, 
complemented by twenty-first century competencies and skills, to afford them 
productive careers in the knowledge-based economy.      
 This proactive and deliberate parent engagement strategy appears to be well-
informed as there is some evidence that students in Singapore schools benefit from 
learning-centered home and parent resources (Chen, 2014; Stright & Yeo, 2014). For 
example, a study of 5041 fourth graders from 177 Singapore schools found that students 
had higher mathematics achievement if they had more books and if they spoke more of 
the test language (English) at home (Chen, 2014). Another study (Stright & Yeo, 2014) 
of 712 third to sixth graders from nine Singapore schools found that students whose 
parents engaged more with teachers on specific learning issues had higher overall school 
achievement. The same study also reported that children of outwardly affirmative 
parents who were involved in their children’s schooling (e.g., via attending or 
supporting school events) had higher overall school achievement.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The present analysis highlights the unique socio-economic-political 
circumstances that contextualize the Singapore education system and that account for its 
somewhat different developmental trajectory from the otherwise ubiquitous path some 
analysts claim to recognize for education systems on their track towards excellence.  In 
this sense Singapore fails strictly to conform to the McKinsey&Company model that 
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recognizes an inexorable path towards a progressive principal- and teacher- (that is, 
professional) autonomy leading towards school self-direction. International comparative 
studies, such as the McKinsey&Company and OECD PISA reports, have claimed that 
education systems progressing towards and achieving excellence will inexorably 
devolve significant powers of decision-making from the center to schools, and that the 
locus of innovation will emanate more from principals and teachers in an empowered 
professional fraternity than from system-mandated changes.   
 It should not be forgotten that between 1956 and the mid-1970s, Singapore was 
in danger of being classified a ‘failed state’, divided ethnically and linguistically, a 
faltering port-based economy, and a segmented education system. Political control and 
legitimacy - achieved through sustained economic growth – plus the establishment of a 
sound education system - were the required policy responses (Gopinathan, 2007). It may 
be conjectured that many other states (eg.in the Middle East and Africa) might benefit 
from the Singapore model. 
In this paper, we have not only challenged this assumption, but have elaborated 
on how, despite the relatively high degree of central control from MOE, albeit nuanced, 
and the lack of opportunity for principals and teachers to exercise high levels of 
professional discretion over curriculum and assessment and resource allocation – despite 
their high degree of professionalism - Singapore students have continued to exhibit 
comparatively high levels of academic achievement. In the analysis, we have argued that 
a unique combination of competent system direction and strategic leadership, tight 
coupling of the Singapore education system, and sociocultural premium on achievement 
have seemingly ameliorated the structural limitations associated with a tightly controlled 
system, and have coalesced to contribute to the outstanding levels of student 
achievement. Conceptualized in Giddens’ (1979) agency-structure framework, structural 
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constraints imposed by MOE curtail the professional autonomy and agency that 
principals in other more decentralized systems might exercise, according to the 
McKinsey&Company’s typology. Furthermore, perhaps because of the compactness and 
tight coupling between stakeholders inherent in the Singapore education system, 
principals in Singapore find it challenging to harness the social capital that might arise 
from their collegial relationships with other peers in the fraternity to moderate the 
impact of these structural constraints (Bolden, Petrov, & Gosling, 2008).  
While the system functions efficiently and effectively at present, there are 
lingering questions however, as to whether this containment of the professionalism of 
principals will adversely impact their sense of professional identity in terms of their self-
image, self-esteem, self-efficacy, job motivation, task perceptions, and career 
expectations (Kelchtermans, 1993), or whether their presence within a highly regarded 
world leading system will in some way compensate. A further question is whether the 
prevalence of strong central control – a model best suited to an industrial economy, a 
stage which Singapore left as it entered the 21st century, is capable of delivering the 
post-1997 reforms, including the desired levels of creativity and innovation spread 
widely across the educated population of Singapore as it sustains its status as a 
knowledge-based economy (Ng & Tan, 2006). Does such a post-industrial society 
necessitate an education system where principals are not fearful of taking necessary 
initiatives to improve student learning – even when such opportunities exist - without 
clear approval from the center (Hallinger, Taraseina, & Miller, 1994)? Critics also argue 
that the status quo also portends risks of leadership conformity, homogeneity, 
parochialism, and inflexibility; tension with the cultivation of teacher leadership; and 
difficulties with overall leadership renewal towards a more diverse school leadership 
cadre better suited to a global, competitive world (Dimmock & Tan, 2013; Walker & 
PROFESSIONALISATION AND SCHOOL AUTONOMY 
 
31 
 
Dimmock, 2002). The potential ramifications of these multiple risks and challenges on 
student learning and achievement warrant deliberation among the powerful bureaucrats 
in MOE on the developmental trajectory of professionalism and governance in the 
Singapore education system. To date, it appears that Singapore has forged its own 
trajectory or pathway, like other systems of education, seeming to defy the generic 
trajectory whereby the world’s leading education systems inexorably depend for their 
high performance and progressively follow a path towards more school-led, self-directed 
and professionalized policy making and practice. Whether Singapore will continue along 
its unique path of education governance will depend on its ability to continue to provide 
a workforce equipped with the skills needed by a dynamic knowledge-based economy, 
its capacity to produce a loyal citizenry, both of which ultimately depend on whether it 
can successfully restore levels of social mobility and equity that its people think are fair. 
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Table 1 
OECD School Autonomy Index (adapted from OECD, PISA 2012 Database) 
 ← More school autonomy  → Less school autonomy 
 UK Hong 
Kong 
OECD 
Average 
Shanghai, 
China 
Singapore Vietnam 
Over resource 
Allocation 
+1.2 +0.4 0 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 
Over curriculum & 
assessment 
+0.9 +1.0 0 -0.6 -0.25 -1.0 
 
Criteria used to measure principals’, teachers’ and regional/natural administrators’ perceptions of 
autonomy over (a) resource allocation: hiring and firing teachers, deciding teachers’ starting salaries, 
deciding teachers’ salary increases, formulating the school budget, allocating school budget; (b) 
curriculum and assessment: establishing student assessment policies, choosing textbooks, determining 
course content, deciding which courses to offer. 
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Table 2 
Lesson Structure by Level (Classroom Observation Data) 
Primary 5 (Rank ordered) % of 
Phases 
Secondary 3 (Ranked 
ordered) 
% of 
Phases 
Whole class answer checking 
/ IRE 
27.6 Whole class lecture/ 
Monologue 
32.0 
Whole class lecture/ 
Monologue 
20.5 Whole class answer checking 
/ IRE 
22.0 
Whole class elicitation and 
discussion 
6.3 Whole class elicitation and 
discussion 
6.2 
Whole class demonstration/ 
Activity 
3.3 Whole class demonstration/ 
Activity 
2.7 
Choral repetition 3.0 Choral repetition 1.4 
Subtotal 60.7 Subtotal 62.3 
 
Individual work 18.3 Individual work 17.6 
Small group work 12.1 Small group work 10.2 
Student demonstration 5.2 Student demonstration 5.2 
Test-taking 1.6 Test-taking 1.6 
Laboratory/ Experiment 2.2 Laboratory/ Experiment 1.1 
Total 100 Total 100 
    
Number of lessons 591 Number of lessons 578 
 
Source: Hogan and Colleagues (2009) 
 
